Despite the frequency of stillbirths, the subsequent implications are overlooked and underappreciated. We present findings from comprehensive, systematic literature reviews, and new analyses of published and unpublished data, to establish the effect of stillbirth on parents, families, health-care providers, and societies worldwide. Data for direct costs of this event are sparse but suggest that a stillbirth needs more resources than a livebirth, both in the perinatal period and in additional surveillance during subsequent pregnancies. Indirect and intangible costs of stillbirth are (...) extensive and are usually met by families alone. This issue is particularly onerous for those with few resources. Negative effects, particularly on parental mental health, might be moderated by empathic attitudes of care providers and tailored interventions. The value of the baby, as well as the associated costs for parents, families, care providers, communities, and society, should be considered to prevent stillbirths and reduce associated morbidity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.4 (2001) 11-21 [Access article in PDF] Alphonso Lingis's We—A Collage, not a Collective Alexander E. Hooke Alphonso Lingis. Abuses. Berkeley: U of California P, 1994. [AB]________. The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994. [COMM]________. Dangerous Emotions. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000. [DE]________. Foreign Bodies.New York: Routledge, 1994. [FB]________. The Imperative Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. [IMP] For Walt Fuchs 1 (...) Alphonso Lingis is unabashed in his uses of we. He does not speak about a privileged we, an exemplary or hegemonic we, or "we." According to this American philosopher, the various ways critics qualify their references to first person plural (we, us, our) are unnecessary, if not unjustifiable. Their caution and skepticism about any direct use of we invariably lead one to focus on this important pronoun as if it were a rhetorical sleight of hand, an ironic twist, a sign of embarrassment or elitism. Worse, their gradual cynicism diminishes or derides the reality of those whose contact with others can only be articulated in terms of we or our. Thus readers, and students subject to these theoretical reservations, are tempted to circumvent any substantive meaning to first-person plural in their own reflections and research. Given the persuasive charms of these reservations, to admit a genuine or lived we involves the risk of being charged with superficiality, a lack of sophistication, nostalgia, or political naiveté. 1In the face of this risk, Lingis writes in first-person plural without apology. Seemingly oblivious to the ongoing controversies over any legitimate use of we—as if it connoted self-indulgence or self-delusion, Lingis depicts experiences and contacts that embody a substance to first-person plural. These contacts are presented directly and with little hesitation, as they often move one to awaken to daring, brazen, or unfamiliar individuals in their contexts and surroundings. To present them requires an air of innocence to the extent that the contacts appear as new to the writer as they are to the reader. [End Page 11]They encompass more than surprise and spectacle. They also initiate beliefs and emotions that embrace other truths: unfamiliar expressions of gods, strange forms of human commitments, eccentric relations humans have with the past and future, but also with animals, trees, and unseen spirits. These truths evoke the kinds of genuine goods and values that are better conceived not as potential instantiations or counterexamples to our generalizations and conventions, but rather as compelling additions to our own senses of reality and truth.In writing about we or us, however, Lingis also raises some critical stakes. While conversant with most of the influential figures and themes discussed under the postmodern rubric, Lingis extends their central ideas to new levels and fields of inquiry. Instead of scrutinizing the uses of first-person plural or maintaining a respectable distance from them, his philosophical endeavors are distinct insofar as they address: How do we, he and his audience, respond to the many kinds of contact that are readily dismissed insofar as they overlooked in our scholarly and philosophical endeavors? What might these other uses and realities of the first-person plural say that affirm, question, or contest us? Can his own work, lucidly presented in five recent books, contribute to contemporary discussions about the possibilities and pitfalls of human relations, cultural and political entities, social and biological communities, and the theoretical or critical reflections on them? 2 Lingis's answers are guided by looking at we more as a collage and less as a collective. A collage, unlike a collection, emphasizes or highlights the unpredictable ways that humans and other life forms come together. The use of we as a collective—whether the result of unconscious drives, chosen ideologies, an intersubjective ethic, or rational communication acts—emphasizes certain values, particularly those that help us to distinguish whether the experiences of we can be understood or appreciated in terms of true or false, good or bad, genuine or superficial, beautiful or ugly, familiar and significant terms for making judgments about moral, social, and... (shrink)

The article attempts to develop the methodological foundations of innovation as a new field of scientific research that studies innovation in science, culture and society. On the basis of the philosophical and methodological approach, the term “innovation” is conceptualized. The definition of the concept of innovation proposed in the article is based on the “procedural approach” in the interpretation of innovation activity and at the same time emphasizes the significance of the final result in the form of a new product (...) that has commercial (social) value. In the context of modern trends in technogenic civilization, the essential features of innovative activity are revealed, its high degree of uncertainty and sensitivity to random changes and the influence of the external environment is revealed, it is shown that, along with organization, self-organization processes play an important role in it, manifested in complex, spontaneous changes accompanying the emergence of innovations. It is concluded that these features are evidence of the synergistic nature of innovation. The “rehabilitation” of synergetics is being carried out, which is considered as an ontological basis for building an innovative methodology. The article also formulates the basic principles of innovation methodology: openness of innovation, unity of linearity and non-linearity, probabilistic nature, the principle of systemic communication and organization, interdisciplinarity, the principle of relying on feedback. The possibility of creating an innovative method is being assessed. On this basis, the modern status of innovation is determined as an independent field of knowledge that has its own object, subject, functions, subjects, methodology, social mechanisms and the sphere of innovative consciousness, as well as other distinctive features of any particular science. A new approach to understanding the social and humanitarian expertise of high-risk innovative projects is proposed. (shrink)

The familiar Vendler-Kenny scheme of verb-types, viz., performances (further differentiated by Vedler into accomplishments and achievements), activities, and states, is too narrow in two important respects. First, it is narrow linguistically. It fails to take into account the phenomenon of verb aspect. The trichotomy is not one of verbs as lexical types but of predications. Second, the trichotomy is narrow ontologically. It is a specification in the context of human agency of the more fundamental, topic-neutral trichotomy, event-process-state.The central component in (...) this ontological trichotomy, event, can be sharply differentiated from its two flanking components by adapting a suggestion by Geoffrey N. Leech and others that the contrast between perfective and imperfective aspect in verbs corresponds to the count/mass distinction in the domain of nouns. With the help of two distinctions, of cardinal count adverbials versus frequency adverbials, and of occurrence versus associated occasion, two interrelated criteria for event predication are developed. Accordingly, Mary capsized the boat is an event predication because (a) it is equivalent to There was at least one capsizing of the boat by Mary, or (b) because it admits cardinal count adverbials, e.g., at least once, twice, three times. Ontologically speaking, events are defined as those occurrences that are inherently countable. (shrink)

This collection introduces readers to some of the most respected Pre-Socratic scholarship of the twentieth century. It includes translations of important works from European scholars that were previously unavailable in English and incorporates the major topics and approaches of contemporary scholarship. Here is an essential book for students and scholars alike. "Students of the Pre-Socratics must be grateful to Mourelatos and his publishers for making these essays available to a wider public."--T. H. Irwin, American Journal of Philology "Mourelatos is a (...) superb editor, and teaching Pre-Socratics in the future with this collection on the reading list will not only be easier but also better."--Jorgen Mejer, The Classical World "The editor has done his work judiciously. It would be difficult to devise a better balance between different parts of the subject."--Edward Hussey, Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences "[This book] will undoubtedly become an indispensable aid for beginning and advanced students of the Pre-Socratics."--David E. Hahm, Isis. (shrink)

Biological ontologies are used to organize, curate, and interpret the vast quantities of data arising from biological experiments. While this works well when using a single ontology, integrating multiple ontologies can be problematic, as they are developed independently, which can lead to incompatibilities. The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry was created to address this by facilitating the development, harmonization, application, and sharing of ontologies, guided by a set of overarching principles. One challenge in reaching these goals was that the (...) OBO principles were not originally encoded in a precise fashion, and interpretation was subjective. Here we show how we have addressed this by formally encoding the OBO principles as operational rules and implementing a suite of automated validation checks and a dashboard for objectively evaluating each ontology’s compliance with each principle. This entailed a substantial effort to curate metadata across all ontologies and to coordinate with individual stakeholders. We have applied these checks across the full OBO suite of ontologies, revealing areas where individual ontologies require changes to conform to our principles. Our work demonstrates how a sizable federated community can be organized and evaluated on objective criteria that help improve overall quality and interoperability, which is vital for the sustenance of the OBO project and towards the overall goals of making data FAIR. Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest. (shrink)

Let ${2-\textsf{RAN}}$ be the statement that for each real X a real 2-random relative to X exists. We apply program extraction techniques we developed in Kreuzer and Kohlenbach (J. Symb. Log. 77(3):853–895, 2012. doi:10.2178/jsl/1344862165), Kreuzer (Notre Dame J. Formal Log. 53(2):245–265, 2012. doi:10.1215/00294527-1715716) to this principle. Let ${{\textsf{WKL}_0^\omega}}$ be the finite type extension of ${\textsf{WKL}_0}$ . We obtain that one can extract primitive recursive realizers from proofs in ${{\textsf{WKL}_0^\omega} + \Pi^0_1-{\textsf{CP}} + 2-\textsf{RAN}}$ , i.e., if ${{\textsf{WKL}_0^\omega} + \Pi^0_1-{\textsf{CP}} + 2-\textsf{RAN} (...) \, {\vdash} \, \forall{f}\, {\exists}{x} A_{qf}(f,x)}$ then one can extract from the proof a primitive recursive term t(f) such that ${A_{qf}(f,t(f))}$ . As a consequence, we obtain that ${{\textsf{WKL}_0}+ \Pi^0_1 - {\textsf{CP}} + 2-\textsf{RAN}}$ is ${\Pi^0_3}$ -conservative over ${\textsf{RCA}_0}$. (shrink)

We report the identification of a recurrent, 520-kb 16p12.1 microdeletion associated with childhood developmental delay. The microdeletion was detected in 20 of 11,873 cases compared with 2 of 8,540 controls and replicated in a second series of 22 of 9,254 cases compared with 6 of 6,299 controls. Most deletions were inherited, with carrier parents likely to manifest neuropsychiatric phenotypes compared to non-carrier parents. Probands were more likely to carry an additional large copy-number variant when compared to matched controls. The clinical (...) features of individuals with two mutations were distinct from and/or more severe than those of individuals carrying only the co-occurring mutation. Our data support a two-hit model in which the 16p12.1 microdeletion both predisposes to neuropsychiatric phenotypes as a single event and exacerbates neurodevelopmental phenotypes in association with other large deletions or duplications. Analysis of other microdeletions with variable expressivity indicates that this two-hit model might be more generally applicable to neuropsychiatric disease. © 2010 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

At some time around August 324b.c., Antipater, the regent of Macedonia received orders from Alexander the Great that he was to be replaced with another eminent officer in the Macedonian court, Craterus. In addition to his removal from office, Antipater was ordered by Alexander to leave Macedonia for the East, bringing with him fresh levies to replenish those that comprised Craterus' own contingent of veterans from Opis. Though Craterus left Alexander's court shortly thereafter, neither man can be (...) said to have made the journey speedily or directly. A range of reasons has been given to explain Craterus' slow advancement, including the construction of infrastructure to allow the transportation of military resources from east to west, the poor state of his health, and the need to recruit more men. By the time of Alexander's death in June of 323, Craterus and his forces had only reached the province of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia. Antipater's immediate reaction to his new role is not recorded, but what is known is that he remained steadfast in Macedonia, seemingly in defiance of Alexander's orders. It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate Antipater's refusal to depart from Macedonia, to explore whether tensions between Antipater and his replacement could account for Craterus' sluggish advance and to highlight the impact that Greek domestic politics had on Antipater's position in Macedonia. (shrink)

Professor Kamerbeek in a recent article raises some interesting questions about the value of the manuscript of Sophocles Parisinus gr. 2712, universally known as A. Ever since the time of Brunck, who was the first to use this manuscript extensively, it has been considered second only to Laurentianus XXXII 9 as a source of correct readings and as a witness of the old, i.e. pre-Byzantine, tradition of Sophocles. But the importance of A has been seriously challenged by Alexander Turyn, (...) who has sought to show that in Ajax, Electra, and Oedipus Tyrannus—the three plays which constitute the Byzantine Triad of Sophocles—A's text is principally that of the recension of Manuel Moschopulus —or, more strictly, the version of that recension which includes scholia by Maximus Planudes and some slight variations in the poetic text. (shrink)

Since the appearance in 1952 of Alexander Turyn's Studies in the Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Sophocles it has been quite clear that editors must abandon the traditional stemma and with it much of their traditional thinking about the text. One of Turyn's most important contributions to Sophoclean studies has been his treatment of what he calls the vetustiores.

Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. (...) Many of these attempts at reformulation, I’ll argue, have been missteps. A number of these different reformulations are incapable of carrying out a central role a truth norm is meant to play, that of explaining justification. The truth norm I’ll defend, however, avoids the implausible results of a prescription to believe all the truths, but doesn’t thereby fail to explain justification. This norm, introduced by Conor McHugh, states that if one has some doxastic attitude about p—i.e. if one believes, disbelieves, or suspends judgement about whether p—then one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. (shrink)

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ?Q and I don't believe that Q? sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don (...) Fallis). (shrink)

The strong and the weak deontic operators, O and p, Have been employed as operators on names of acts (e.G. By g h von wright) and on imperatives (e.G. By m fisher), But most commonly as proposition forming operators on propositions (e.G. By a n prior). But a strong case can be made out for the introduction of two kinds of adverbial deontic operator operating respectively on a proposition and on a predicate. These two operators can be used to symbolize (...) the kantian notions of acting in accordance with the moral law and acting out of respect for the moral law. In this paper the syntactic properties of these adverbial operators are examined in detail and a start is made on the symbolization of a system, A system of kantian deontic logic, Containing them. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the rule-following problem and its impact on the sociology of science as K.A. Rodin presents them in his article. It is known that L. Wittgenstein in “Philosophical Studies”, using the rule of arithmetic addition as an example, formulated the rule-following problem, which has acquired the ultimate form of skepticism thanks to S. Kripke. This problem was transferred to the sociology of science by D. Bloor, where it received the following sociological explanation: rule-amenably activity can be (...) understood only by incorporating rules into social institutions. P. Winch rejected a skeptical interpretation of this problem, and as K.A. Rodin shows in the article, most adequately showed the consequences of Wittgenstein’s ideas for sociology. In his answer, A.A. Sanzhenakov draws attention to two circumstances. Firstly, sociology was influenced not only by late but also early ideas of Wittgenstein. Secondly, the rule-following problem as an important factor in the sociological turn can also be found in the phenomenology of E. Husserl. The author concludes about the need for additional research, which will draw a line between the influence of Wittgenstein and Husserl on sociology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 161 7 In, respectively, PaciWsm in Britain and Semi-Detached Idealists: the British Peace Movement and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2000). 8 See Monk 2: Chap. 13. FUNCTIONS OR PROPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONS? Alexander Paul Bozzo Philosophy / Marquette U. Milwaukee, wi 53233, usa alexander[email protected] Michael Potter and Tom Ricketts, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge, uk: (...) Cambridge U. P., 2010. Pp. vii, 630. isbn 978-0-521-62479-4 (pb). £57.00; £21.99 (pb). us$38.99 (pb). February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd 162 Reviews 1 Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (Cambridge, ma: Harvard U. P., 1991), p. 111. The paragraph contains an expression of Frege’s Context Principle and the need for Hume’s Principle as a criterion of identity in the deWnition of number. 2 There are in fact Wve stated goals. The others are: (iii) to serve as a reference work for students and non-specialists, (iv) to provide a route into the study of Frege historically and to any relevant contemporary concerns in the philosophies of logic, language, mathematics, and mind, and (v) to provide, for new readers, the most convenient detailed guide to Frege currently available. Gottlob Frege is widely recognized as one of the chief progenitors of mathematical logic and philosophy of languagez—zindeed, the importance attributed to Frege’s innovations is such that Michael Dummett, when reXecting on§62 of Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, feels compelled to remark that the paragraph therein is “arguably the most pregnant philosophical paragraph ever written.”1 Whether or not one agrees with Dummett on this point, the magnitude of Frege’s inXuence on the current philosophical landscape is incontestable. Frege revolutionized the then dominant Aristotelian conception of logic, introducing a formal language now recognized as the predicate calculus. Central to this end were Frege’s insights on quantiWcation, the notation that expressed it, the logicist project, and the extension of mathematical notions like function and argument to natural language. The long-awaited Cambridge Companion to Frege is a compendium of Fregean scholarship that rigorously explores these and similar topics; editors Thomas Ricketts and Michael Potter have compiled a comprehensive collection of fourteen essays that individually provide focused appraisals of a number of Frege’s most substantial insights. On the advice of this journal’s editor, I have limited my review to the connections (or rather dissimilarities ) that exist between Frege and Russell, relying exclusively on Peter Hylton ’s contribution to the collection, “Frege and Russell”. Following a brief consideration of the volume as a whole, I move immediately into a detailed explication of Hylton’s analysis. The volume includes among its goals the following two aims: (i) to provide, for advanced students and specialists, a conspectus of recent interpretation of Frege, and (ii) to dispel the intimidation felt by readers who confront a diUcult thinker.2 I single out these ambitions because they most clearly represent the volume’s strengths and shortcomings. Enthusiasts of Frege will not be disappointed by the multitude of rigorously and technically written essays, essays that contribute substantially and originally to the collective understanding of Frege and his work. For instance, Thomas Ricketts provides a thoughtful and thorough analysis—an analysis that moves well beyond mere explication—of Frege’s concept/object distinction, in particular its relevance for Frege’s Context Principle and logicism more generally. Similarly, Richard Heck addresses a number of central yet largely unexplored issues pertaining to the overall signiWcance of February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 163 3 I strongly encourage that non-specialists augment The Cambridge Companion to Frege with Joan Weiner’s Frege Explained: from Arithmetic to Analytic Philosophy (Chicago : Open Court, 2004), one of the best available introductory texts on Frege. 4 The essay in fact was available as early as 2005 in Hylton’s Propositions, Functions, and Analysis: Selected Essays on Russell’s Philosophy (New York, ny: Oxford U. P., 2005). The editors of The Cambridge Companion to Frege partially... (shrink)

Hackles have been raised in biosemiotic circles by T. L. Short’s assertion that semiosis, as defined by Peirce, entails “acting for purposes” and therefore is not found below the level of the organism (2007a:174–177). This paper examines Short’s teleology and theory of purposeful behavior and offers a remedy to the disagreement. Remediation becomes possible when the issue is reframed in the terms of the complexity sciences, which allows intentionality to be understood as the interplay between local and global aspects of (...) a system within a system. What is called “acting for purposes” is not itself a type of behavior so much as a relationship between a dynamic system that “exists for a purpose” and its microprocesses that “serve purposes.” The “intentional object” of philosophy is recast here as the holistic self-organized dynamics of a system, which exists for the purpose of self-maintenance, and that constrains the parts’ behaviors, which serve the purpose of forming the system. (A “system” can be any emergent, e.g. an abiotic form, an adapted species, a self, a conditioned response, thought, or a set of ideas.) The self-organized whole, which is represented to the parts in their own constrained behaviors, assumes the guiding function so long attributed to the mysterious “intentional object.” If emergent self-causation is not disallowed, creative originality, as well as directionality, becomes part of the definition of purposeful behavior. Thus, key tools used here, required for understanding emergence, come from poetics rather than semoitics. In the microprocesses of self-organization, I find what I call “accidental” indices and icons — which are poetic in the sense that they involve mere metonymic contiguity and metaphoric similarity — and which are preferentially selected under constrained conditions allowing radically new connections to habituate into an “intentional” self-organized system that, not coincidentally, has some of the emergent characteristics of a conventional symbolic system. (shrink)

Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what (...) I call the phenomenon of reflective defeat: if one is justified in not believing that E makes probable P, then this defeats whatever justification one has for believing P upon the basis of E. I argue that this modified version of externalism has the virtue of accommodating the intuitions that motivate internalism, without the cost of the vicious regress that makes internalism so unattractive. (shrink)

Due to the increasingly heterogeneous trajectories of aging, gerontology requires theoretical models and empirical methods that can meaningfully, reliably, and precisely describe, explain, and predict causes and effects within the aging process, considering particular contexts and situations. Human behavior occurs in contexts; nevertheless, situational changes are often neglected in context-based behavior research. This article follows the tradition of environmental gerontology research based on Lawton’s Person-Environment-Interaction model and the theoretical developments of recent years. The authors discuss that, despite an explicit time (...) component, current P-E models could be strengthened by focusing on detecting P-E interactions in various everyday situations. Enhancing Lawton’s original formula via a situationally based component not only changes the theoretical perspectives on the interplay between person and environment but also demands new data collection approaches in empirical environmental research. Those approaches are discussed through the example of collecting mobile data with smartphones. Future research should include the situational dimension to investigate the complex nature of person environment interactions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 161 7 In, respectively, PaciWsm in Britain and Semi-Detached Idealists: the British Peace Movement and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2000). 8 See Monk 2: Chap. 13. FUNCTIONS OR PROPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONS? Alexander Paul Bozzo Philosophy / Marquette U. Milwaukee, wi 53233, usa alexander[email protected] Michael Potter and Tom Ricketts, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge, uk: (...) Cambridge U. P., 2010. Pp. vii, 630. isbn 978-0-521-62479-4 (pb). £57.00; £21.99 (pb). us$38.99 (pb). February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd 162 Reviews 1 Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (Cambridge, ma: Harvard U. P., 1991), p. 111. The paragraph contains an expression of Frege’s Context Principle and the need for Hume’s Principle as a criterion of identity in the deWnition of number. 2 There are in fact Wve stated goals. The others are: (iii) to serve as a reference work for students and non-specialists, (iv) to provide a route into the study of Frege historically and to any relevant contemporary concerns in the philosophies of logic, language, mathematics, and mind, and (v) to provide, for new readers, the most convenient detailed guide to Frege currently available. Gottlob Frege is widely recognized as one of the chief progenitors of mathematical logic and philosophy of languagez—zindeed, the importance attributed to Frege’s innovations is such that Michael Dummett, when reXecting on§62 of Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, feels compelled to remark that the paragraph therein is “arguably the most pregnant philosophical paragraph ever written.”1 Whether or not one agrees with Dummett on this point, the magnitude of Frege’s inXuence on the current philosophical landscape is incontestable. Frege revolutionized the then dominant Aristotelian conception of logic, introducing a formal language now recognized as the predicate calculus. Central to this end were Frege’s insights on quantiWcation, the notation that expressed it, the logicist project, and the extension of mathematical notions like function and argument to natural language. The long-awaited Cambridge Companion to Frege is a compendium of Fregean scholarship that rigorously explores these and similar topics; editors Thomas Ricketts and Michael Potter have compiled a comprehensive collection of fourteen essays that individually provide focused appraisals of a number of Frege’s most substantial insights. On the advice of this journal’s editor, I have limited my review to the connections (or rather dissimilarities ) that exist between Frege and Russell, relying exclusively on Peter Hylton ’s contribution to the collection, “Frege and Russell”. Following a brief consideration of the volume as a whole, I move immediately into a detailed explication of Hylton’s analysis. The volume includes among its goals the following two aims: (i) to provide, for advanced students and specialists, a conspectus of recent interpretation of Frege, and (ii) to dispel the intimidation felt by readers who confront a diUcult thinker.2 I single out these ambitions because they most clearly represent the volume’s strengths and shortcomings. Enthusiasts of Frege will not be disappointed by the multitude of rigorously and technically written essays, essays that contribute substantially and originally to the collective understanding of Frege and his work. For instance, Thomas Ricketts provides a thoughtful and thorough analysis—an analysis that moves well beyond mere explication—of Frege’s concept/object distinction, in particular its relevance for Frege’s Context Principle and logicism more generally. Similarly, Richard Heck addresses a number of central yet largely unexplored issues pertaining to the overall signiWcance of February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 163 3 I strongly encourage that non-specialists augment The Cambridge Companion to Frege with Joan Weiner’s Frege Explained: from Arithmetic to Analytic Philosophy (Chicago : Open Court, 2004), one of the best available introductory texts on Frege. 4 The essay in fact was available as early as 2005 in Hylton’s Propositions, Functions, and Analysis: Selected Essays on Russell’s Philosophy (New York, ny: Oxford U. P., 2005). The editors of The Cambridge Companion to Frege partially... (shrink)

Values and the scope of scientific inquiry, by M. Farber.--The phenomenology of epistemic claims: and its bearing on the essence of philosophy, by R. M. Zaner.--Problems of the Life-World, by A. Gurwitsch.--The Life-World and the particular sub-worlds, by W. Marx.--On the boundaries of the social world, by T. Luckmann.--Alfred Schutz on social reality and social science, by M. Natanson.--Homo oeconomicus and his class mates, by F. Machlup.--Toward a science of political economics, by A. Lowe.--Some notes on reality-orientation in contemporary societies, (...) by A. Brodersen.--The eclipse of reality, by E. Voegelin.--Alienation in Marx's Political economy and philosophy, by P. Merlan.--The problem of multiple realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil, by P. L. Berger.--Phenomenology, history, myth, by F. Kersten.--The role of music in Leonardo's Paragone, by E. Winternitz.--Alfred Schutz bibliography (p. [297]-306). (shrink)

Geiger, M. Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung.--Schwarz, P. Über die Oberste ontologische Kategorie.--Stavenhagen, K. Charismatische Persönlichkeitseinungen.--Celms, T. Lebensumgebung und Lebensprojektion.--Beck, M. Problem der Analogie zwischen seelischen und Dinglichen Qualitäten.--Spiegelberg, H. Sinn und recht der Begründung in der axiologischen und praktischen Philosophie.--Voigtländer, E. Bemerkungen zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen.--Löwenstein, K. Wunsch und wünschen.--Löw, F. Über die Definition.-- Specht, W. Die Grenzen der biologischen Erfassung der Persönlichkeit.--Heller, E. Über die Willenshandlung.

Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...) only certain kinds of inferential justification. In this paper, I clarify and argue against weak internalism. I contend that while weak internalism avoids the vicious regress, it does so at the cost of compromising its internalist credentials. For I show that unless weak internalism makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reasons, the view collapses into externalism. (shrink)